Abstract-In recent years, the area of formal verification of cryptographic protocols became important because of the active intruders. These intruders can find out the flaws in the protocols and can use them to create attacks. To avoid such possible attacks, the protocols must be verified to check if the protocols contain any flaws. The formal verification tools have helped in verifying and correcting the protocols. Various tools are available these days for verifying the protocols. In this paper, the two verification tools namely ProVerif and AVISPA are used for analysis of protocols -AKI (Accountable Key Infrastructure), ARPKI (Attack Resilient Public Key Infrastructure) and OPT (Origin and Path Trace). A comparative evaluation of the selected tools is presented and revealed security properties of the protocols selected.
I. INTRODUCTION
A communication protocol which uses the cryptographic operations is known as the Cryptographic protocol. Cryptographic protocol contains functions such as distribution of keys to the entities, authentication of principals to each other to make the secure transaction or computation over the network. The network is usually assumed to be hostile. The network may contain adversaries who are able to read modify and delete traffic and may have control over some of the principals working in the network. The adversary is able to manipulate the data used by the protocol with which the adversary can form the attacks on the protocol. Some attacks may be dependent on the subtle properties of the cryptographic algorithms or the statistical analysis of message traffic. Formal methods are used to check if such attacks are possible on the protocol.
Formal methods are a combination of a mathematical or a logical model of a system and its requirements, together with an effective procedure for determining whether the proof that a system satisfies its requirements is correct [1] . The use of formal methods for verification has caused developing the tools to verify cryptographic protocols. Some of the verification tools developed are ProVerif [2] , AVISPA [3] , Scyther [4] , TAMARIN [5] , Athena [6] , NRL protocol analyzer [7] , to name a few. The tools differ in their input language, the way of verification and the way in which the output is provided.
In this paper, an attempt is made to evaluate the two popular cryptographic verification tools namely ProVerif and AVISPA. Newly proposed cryptographic protocols AKI (Accountable Key Infrastructure) [8] , ARPKI (Attack Resilient Public Key Infrastructure) [9] and OPT (Origin and Path Trace) [10] are analyzed using both these tools.
Paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the literature survey which includes a brief introduction of ProVerif and AVISPA tools. In Section III, details of selected protocols are presented. Section IV discusses the comparative analysis of the two tools and in Section V the conclusion and probable future work is discussed.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
There are various tools present for the verification of the cryptographic protocols such as Interrogator [11] , NRL protocol analyzer [7] , ProVerif [2] , Scyther [4] , AVISPA [3] , Isabelle [12] , TAMARIN [5] , Coq theorem prover [13] , Athena [6] , Brutus [14] , Murφ [15] etc. In this work, AVISPA and ProVerif are used for the comparative evaluation. The characteristics of these two tools are as follows.
A. ProVerif
ProVerif is a tool for automatically analyzing the security of cryptographic protocols [2] . This is developed by Bruno Blanchet. This tool verifies the protocol for an unbounded number of sessions, using unbounded message space. ProVerif provides an automatic technique to verify correspondences in the protocols. The user has to code the protocol and the correspondences. Correspondences are the properties of the form; if the protocol executes some event then the protocol must have executed some other events before. The events can be described using a logical formula which can contain conjunctions and disjunctions. The tool is capable of attack reconstruction. If a property cannot be proved, the trace which falsifies the desired property is built. In two [3] . These back-ends analyze the protocols assuming there is perfect cryptography and the messages exchanged over the network are under the control of Dolev-Yao intruder. When protocol terminates, each back end outputs the result of analysis using output format stating whether the input format is solved, system resources are exhausted or the problem is not tackled for some reason.
III. PROTOCOLS
In order to analyze the tools, three cryptographic protocols are identified, implemented and analyzed using both ProVerif and AVISPA. The protocols selected are AKI [8] , ARPKI [9] and OPT [10] . Researchers have proposed these new protocols, which will possibly be used in the next generation of network. As these protocols are likely to be used in the future; these protocols must be secure to operate in the hostile environment. In rest of this section the selected protocols are discussed in brief.
A. AKI
Accountable Key Infrastructure (AKI) [8] is a new public key infrastructure. AKI is used to reduce the levels of trust in Certification Authorities (CAs) as research says that now-a-days there is decreased trust in CAs. AKI decentralizes the certification authority and distributes that work between different entities. All these entities monitor each other's work to avoid any malicious activity. AKI combines an accountability infrastructure i.e. providing checks and balances on server operations and misbehavior dissemination, with key revocation mechanisms.
The AKI contains following entities.
 A Domain (server) is a named entity with which clients desire to establish secure connections.  A Client (browser) is an entity establishing TLS connections with domains (servers).
 A Certification Agency is similar to current certification authority which authenticates domains and issues X.509 certificates.
 An Integrity Log Server (ILS) keeps an Integrity
Tree that stores CA-issued certificates to make them publicly visible.
This Integrity Tree is a hash tree of all the registered certificates in lexicographic order. Each ILS updates its Integrity Tree at a given interval, known as ILS_UP.
 Validators monitor ILS operations to detect misbehavior like sudden (dis)appearance of certificates.
Alice owns a domain A.com and she wants to obtain an AKI-protected certificate. She defines CAs and ILSs that she trusts (CA_LIST and ILS_LIST respectively), the minimum number of CA signatures that she recommends her client for validation (CA_MIN) and rules for certificate revocation, replacement and updates. Alice with her public key, contacts more than the minimum number of trusted CAs to sign her certificate. Alice registers the certificate with one or multiple ILSs after the signing of the certificate. Each ILS then adds A.com to its database by placing it into the Integrity Tree. ILS then recomputes hash values and updates the tree for updated verification information.
Whenever browsers connect to Alice's website via HTTPS, Alice supplements her certificate with the verification information that she downloads from every ILS and sends it to browsers. Browser uses the preinstalled ILS public key(s) on her browser to validate ILS information. The client browser occasionally checks with validator, who is continuously updating data by downloading entire ILS data, to confirm that the ILSs' current root hash values are valid. The message flows for AKI is shown in Fig. 1 . 
B. ARPKI
Attack Resilient Public-Key Infrastructure (ARPKI) [9] is also a new public key infrastructure. ARPKI ensures that certificate related operations are transparent and accountable. ARPKI is very closely related to AKI. ARPKI is inspired by AKI's design and uses some of its concepts. In ARPKI there are also three entities as there in AKI, these entities work to authenticate a new certificate to domain, confirm and update that certificate. ARPKI offers extremely strong security guarantees, where compromising n-1 out of n trusted signing and verifying entities is insufficient to launch an impersonation attack [9] .
ARPKI uses three entities for the certificate operations which are two CAs (Certification Agencies) and one ILS (Integrity Log Server). ARPKI's CAs conduct active online confirmations with validator-like capabilities.
Summary of actors and their responsibilities in ARPKI:
 A domain registers ARPKI certificate (ARCert) for itself with ARPKI infrastructure and can use it for securely serving the web pages to the clients.  The CAs check the identity of the domain owner on registration and then sign and give guarantees for the presented certificate.  The CAs are responsible for checking the logs for this ARCert and assuring the correct operation of other entities involved in creating the ARCert.  The CAs download all accepted requests from the ILSes and compare them to the published integrity trees, to check the ILSes behavior.  The ILSes keep a log of all ARCerts registered with them, and provide proofs of existence for ARCerts that are then used by CAs and domains.  Optionally there can be additional validators that execute checks similar to those made by CAs, but without issuing ARCerts themselves.
There are three parts of protocol, ARCert generation, Confirmation and certificate updation. Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the message flow for each protocol respectively.
C. OPT
Origin and Path Trace (OPT) [10] is lightweight, scalable, and secure protocol for source authentication and path validation. Source authentication means the destination and each intermediate router should be able to determine whether the packet indeed originated from the claimed source and whether the packet content has not been altered en route [10] . Path validation means the source, intermediate routers, and the destination should be able to validate that the packet indeed traversed the path known to (or selected by) the source [10] .
Let S be source and D be destination assure that S sends the packets to D along the sequence of routers Ri. In the packet header, source S includes H(P), which is the hash of the packet payload. This helps receiving entities to identify the packet. Each router Ri, on demand, generates key Ki using a symmetric cryptographic operation. OPT uses the keys generated by DRKey protocol. DRKey (Dynamically Re-creatable key) protocol is used for distributing the shared keys between the participant entities. DRKey protocol is of two types, one is when source and destination trust each other and other is when source and destination do not trust each other. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show these two DRKey protocols respectively.
DRKey protocols generate the symmetric keys which will be useful for carrying out OPT protocol. The message flow for the OPT protocol is shown in Fig. 7 . 
IV. ANALYSIS RESULTS
The verification of the selected protocols is done by using ProVerif and AVISPA. On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) is one of the back-ends of AVISPA which is used for the analysis of the selected protocols. OFMC performs both protocol falsification and bounded session verification, by exploring the transition system described by an IF specification in a demand-driven way (i.e., onthe-fly) [3] . The specifications of the protocols are as per our interpretation of the protocols. The analysis results of both the tools for each protocol are discussed below.
A. Analysis of AKI
 Analysis using AVISPA Analysis of the protocol AKI using AVISPA (OFMC) gave an attack trace in which it showed that the intruder can get the certificate for any domain. The CA should check that the message sent by the domain should contain its own information. So that CA will not give the certificate for intruder who is requesting it for another domain. In attack trace it is found that intruder can get the certificate for domain A by sending the public information of A.
Secrecy of the certificate contents was not an issue, integrity is, but that is being assured to be taken care of by other means.
 Analysis using ProVerif
In the analysis of AKI, it is found that the injective correspondences are false but some related non-injective correspondences are true.
Correspondence query is true if and only if, for all executions of the protocol, if the event to the left of the arrow has been executed, then the event to the right of the arrow has also been executed before. Injective correspondence asserts that, for each occurrence of the event to the left of the arrow, there is a distinct earlier occurrence of the event to the right of the arrow.
The false correspondence query shows that the event specified to the left of the arrow can occur without any previous occurrence of the event specified to the right of the arrow, which means authentication failure.
In the result, it is found that the authentication of CA to A violated same was violated in result of AVISPA. Authentication of ILS to A and authentication of A to ILS are also violated but the non injective authentication queries are true for them.
B. Analysis of ARPKI
 Analysis using AVISPA In registration process, the intruder can get the certificate for the domain if the CA1 does not check that the domain is registering its own certificate. The intruder can send the public data of domain which is necessary to get the certificate and if CA1 does not check the data, then the intruder can get the certificate for the domain for a public key of intruder's choice.
A sends message (ARCert, CA1, CA2, ILS1) encrypted with private key of A to CA1 to register the certificate. CA1 sends this message to ILS1 and CA2 to register the certificate, after registering, CA1 will get Accept message from CA2, which it will send it to A. In updation process also this situation is possible, that the intruder can get the certificate from the CA1 by giving the information of the domain.
In confirmation process, it is found that the authentication of the Root value fails. The Root value is the root of the hash tree known as integrity tree in which all the registered certificates are stored in lexicographic order. This Root is generated by the ILS from the tree and sent to the CA2 but the intruder can get this value in between and can send it to CA2 but the intruder cannot change the Root value so it is not an active attack.
 Analysis using ProVerif
Analysis of the three protocols of ARPKI gave following results. In the specification of registration and updation process, there are only authentication queries as there is no secret data. Analysis of registration process has given following result.
In both the results, it is found that authentication of CA1 to ILS1 and authentication of A to CA1 are violated. Violation of authentication of A to CA1 was also detected by AVISPA. Other authentication queries are either true or they cannot be proved. Analysis of confirmation process has given following result.
The secrecy of the message root is true, but the authentication of CA2 to CA1 and authentication of ILS1 to CA2 are violated. The violation of the same authentication of ILS1 to CA2 is detected by AVISPA. Authentication means, suppose B authenticates A on nonce Nb then it means when B receives the message, he can be sure that A has sent Nb. In authentication loss the message cannot be changed in between. One may try to replay such messages to create problems.
C. Analysis of OPT
 Analysis using AVISPA The OPT protocol is safe. Analysis shows that it does not contain vulnerabilities for an attack.
In both the DRKey protocols (i.e. with trust and without trust) the intruder can form a man-in-the-middle attack.
Intruder can get the data which is sent by S to router R1. It is a passive attack but it violates the authentication property. In the attack trace, it is found that intruder can get the data sent by the S (Source). This data is supposed to reach to R1 (Router1) but in between intruder can get this data and can forward it to R1.
 Analysis using ProVerif
When all the three protocols i.e. DRKey with trust, DRKey without trust and OPT are analyzed using ProVerif, it is found that all the specified goals in each protocol are reachable. There is neither any false authentication correspondence nor any violated secrecy query found in any of these protocols. So it is possible to say that the specifications of protocols are safe and don't contain any possibilities of attacks. Table 1 shows the results got after analysis of protocols and the results previously obtained by other tools for the same protocols. Cryptographic protocols specification and verification is important because of the powerful intruders present nowadays. There are various tools present for the purpose of analysis of cryptographic protocols such as ProVerif, Scyther, AVISPA, Athena etc. Specification and verification of cryptographic protocols should be done by possible tools to avoid flaws in the protocols.
D. Comparison
In this experimental work, specification of the protocols namely AKI, ARPKI and OPT is done as per our interpretation of protocols and their analysis has given following results.
1. When AKI is analyzed using AVISPA; it is found that Intruder can get the certificate for any domain. ProVerif's result is same as that of AVISPA. 2. Analysis of ARPKI using both tools gave same result that is, in Registration and Updation process intruder can get the certificate. In confirmation process authentication of Root value fails. 3. Analysis of OPT protocol using AVISPA gave the result that, in both DRKey protocols Intruder can form man-in-the-middle attack, this is passive attack and OPT protocol is safe. OPT When analyzed with ProVerif gave the result that all the protocols are safe.
Future Work:
The proposed work can be extended by verifying these experimented protocols using other tools like Scyther, Isabelle, TAMARIN, Coq theorem prover, Athena etc to have wider evaluation.
